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Rosen: Informed Consent in New York under the Medical Malpractice Insura

INFORMED CONSENT IN NEW YORK UNDER THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE ACT
In December 1974, the Argonaut Insurance Company, an insurance carrier which provided malpractice liability insurance to
80 percent of the physicians practicing in New York, announced
that it would be forced to triple malpractice insurance premiums
within 6 months or drop malpractice coverage altogether.' Soon
thereafter many New York physicians, who were already paying
premiums between $766 and $14,326 annually, declared that they
would not pay higher premiums and threatened to terminate all
but emergency medical services unless malpractice insurance was
made available at reasonable rates. 2 Under the impending threat
of a major disruption of medical services, the New York State
Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice Insurance Act " in an
effort to lower premium rates by reducing the number of malpractice suits.
The primary focus of this article will be on Section 1 of the
Act, which adds section 2805-d' to the Public Health Law. Sec1. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1975, at 43, col. 4 (city ed.).
2. Id.
3. Ch. 109 [1975] McKinney's Laws of N.Y. 134, as amended, ch. 476 119751
McKinney's Laws of N.Y. 715. The Act attempts to solve the problem of medical malpractice insurance in the following ways: it institutes significant substantive and procedural
changes in the tort law system; creates a Medical Malpractice Insurance Association to
supply malpractice insurance if such insurance becomes unavailable in the private market; establishes a Medical and Hospital Malpractice Fund within the State Insurance
Fund to provide malpractice insurance in the event that the Medical Malpractice
Insurance Association created by the Act becomes insolvent; and provides certain procedures for the professional discipline of doctors.
4. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1975). This section reads as
follows:
§ 2805-d. Limitation of medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent.
1. Lack of informed consent means the failure of the person providing the
professional treatment or diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives
thereto and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in
a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
2. The right of action to recover for medical malpractice based on a lack
of informed consent is limited to those cases involving either (a) non-emergency
treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic procedure which involved
invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body.
3. For a cause of action therefor it must also be established that a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have undergone the
treatment or diagnosis if he had been fully informed and that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which recovery
is sought.
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tion 2805-d codifies certain principles which had been developed
by the courts pertaining to causes of action based on lack of informed consent. Sections 2805-d (1)- and (3)6 establish the elements of the cause of action. Section 2805-d (2) 7 limits the action
to cases involving non-emergency treatment or a diagnostic procedure which invades or disrupts the integrity of the body. In
addition, section 2805-d (4)1 provides the defendant-physician
with four defenses which may justify treatment despite the lack
of an informed consent.
According to common law, a lack of consent is "part of the
definition of an assault." 9 The first New York decision considering the issue of consent in a medical context was Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital'" where Mr. Justice (then Judge)
Cardozo stated: I
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.
[Citations omitted.]
Based on this general rule of law, the courts began to develop
various principles applicable to actions stemming from the alleged failure of the physician to obtain a valid consent from the
patient. The courts were divided, however, on certain important
4. It shall be a defense to any action for medical malpractice based upon
an alleged failure to obtain such an informed consent that:
(a) the risk not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure;
or
(b) the patient assured the medical practitioner he would undergo the
treatment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of the risk involved, or the patient
assured the medical practitioner that he did not want to be informed of the
matters to which he would be entitled to be informed; or
(c) consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible; or
(d) the medical practitioner, after considering all of the attendant facts
and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to
which such alternatives or risks were disclosed to the patient because he reasonably believed that the manner and extent of such disclosure could reasonably
be expected to adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition.
5. Id. § 2805-d (1).
6. Id. § 2805-d (3).
7. Id. § 2805-d (2).
8. Id. § 2805-d (4).
9. Ford v. Ford, 143 Mass. 577, 578, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (1887) (opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
11. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
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issues. For example, what risks or alternatives is the physician
obligated to disclose in order for a court to find that the consent
given was an informed consent?12 Does the unauthorized touching
of the patient's body constitute a battery 13 or is the physician's
failure to disclose pertinent information to the patient actionable
negligence? 4 Must the plaintiff-patient offer expert testimony
concerning the alleged insufficiency of the disclosure or is the
jury competent to make such a determination without the aid
of an expert?1 5 By legislative fiat, section 2805-d ends much of
this controversy: This article will examine the principles which
had been applied by the courts in attempting to resolve these
questions and the manner in which section 2805-d and related
provisions of the Malpractice Act will affect the future disposition of cases based on lack of informed consent.
Battery or Negligence?
Often a plaintiff's complaint will allege that prior to
treatment the physician failed to obtain an informed consent,
thereby leaving it to the court to decide whether such a complaint states a cause of action in battery or negligence. This decision may affect the outcome of the case, since proof of different
factual, procedural, and substantive elements may be required,
depending upon the theory of liability relied on by the court.
At common law, an intentional unconsented-to touching of
12. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
13. For cases which hold that the action is based on battery see Bang v. Charles T.
Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N.W. 12 (1905); Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955); Pearl v. Lesnick, 19
N.Y.2d 590, 224 N.E.2d 739, 278 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1967); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App.
Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1973); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1974).
14. For cases holding that the action is based on negligence see Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearingdenied but decision explained, 187 Kan. 186, 354
P.2d 670 (1960); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960); Abril v. Syntex, 81 Misc. 2d 112, 364 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1975); Terry v. Albany Med. Center Hosp., 78 Misc. 2d 1035, 359 N.Y.S.2d
235 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974); Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964);
Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). For commentary on the negligencebattery question see McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 423-25 (1957); Plante, An Analysis of "Informed
Consent," 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968); Comment, Duty of Doctor to Inform Patient
of Risks of Treatment: Battery or Negligence?, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 217 (1961). See also
Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961).
15. See text accompanying note 26 infra.
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another constitutes a battery." The tortfeasor's state of mind
need not be hostile, nor need there be an intent to do harm.' 7 In
a medical malpractice context it is likely that the physiciantortfeasor actually intends to bestow a benefit on the patient.
Good intentions notwithstanding, if the physician intends to, and
does in fact, touch a patient from whom a valid consent has not
been obtained, that physician has committed a battery.
If the consent is invalid because the physician neglected to
disclose a particular risk, and if such nondisclosure proximately
results in actual injury to the patient, negligence, as well as battery, may be properly alleged. The proposition that a tort may be
both intentional (battery) and unintentional (negligent) appears
to be a contradiction in terms. Courts have nevertheless recognized both theories of liability where the cause of action is based
upon the failure of the physician to obtain a valid, informed
consent. In battery, the tort is completed at the moment of the
unconsented-to touching'8 whereas in negligence there must be
actual injury in order for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie
case. To illustrate, suppose a patient consents to an operation
which has a high risk of resulting in paralysis. If the physician
fails to disclose this risk, the consent may be vitiated. Thus, the
moment the physician touches the patient's body to perform the
operation a battery has been committed. If, but only if, the patient suffers actual injury (paralysis) could the physician be liable
for negligence. Thus, if the patient becomes paralyzed the physician could be liable for both battery and negligence.
Courts and commentators have distinguished various fact
patterns for the purpose of determining if either of these two
liability theories is more appropriate to a particular case. Some
courts have reasoned that the battery approach is more appropriate when the physician has obtained no consent whatsoever, 0 or
has gone beyond the treatment for which the consent was obtained,' whereas a negligence analysis is more properly applied
to those situations where the physician has failed to disclose a
16. See W. PHOSSER, LAw OF TORTS

§9

(4th ed. 1971).

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 30.
20. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914) (express prohibition).
21. See, e.g., Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955) (patient consented to
exploratory surgery; surgeon performed a mastectomy).
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particular risk of, or alternative to, the proposed treatment.
Faced with the latter type of case, the California Supreme Court
22
in Cobbs v. Grant observed:
[W]hen the patient consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed inherent complication with a low probability occurs, no intentional deviation
from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining
consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose
pertinent information. In that situation, the action should be
pleaded in negligence.
This distinction has also been recognized in New York. In
Bruse v. Brickner,23 the plaintiff alleged a lack of informed consent. At trial the defendant, relying on the appellate case of Pearl
v. Lesnick, 24 claimed that the action was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations applicable to actions for battery. The Bruse
court distinguished Pearl as'a case whichn
involve[d] no element of failure to adequately inform the plaintiff in obtaining her consent but [was] a case where plaintiff
claim[ed] that the defendant doctor performed a radical mastectomy upon her after specifically agreeing not to. As the court
held, this would constitute an assault and should quite justly be
controlled by the Statute of Limitations governing assaults
• . .[Wlhere there is no element of willful wrongdoing on
the part of the doctor but rather a negligent failure to carry out
his professional duty to inform his patient.

. .

the malpractice

Statute of Limitations should apply rather than the assault
statute.
A court's decision whether the laws of negligence or battery
are to govern may determine the necessity of adducing expert
testimony. Some commentators have opined that if the court
were to accept the battery theory, plaintiff need not offer any
expert testimony on the alleged insufficiency of the disclosure. 2
22. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 241-42, 502 P.2d 1, 8, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512 (1972).
23. 78 Misc. 2d 999, 359 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County 1974).
24. 20 App. Div. 2d 761, 247 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 590, 224
N.E.2d 739, 278 N.Y.S.2d 237 (1967).
25. 78 Misc. 2d 999, 999-1000, 359 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208-09 (Sup. Ct. Fulton County
1974).
26. See, e.g., Comment, Informed Consent: A MalpracticeHeadache, 47 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 242, 246 (1971); Comment, Informed Consent as a Theory of Medical Liability,
1970 Wis. L. REV. 879, 884.
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Expert testimony will not be needed if the issue is simply whether
there was any consent given at all, or whether the treatment went
beyond the consent. In such cases the testimony of the patientplaintiff will be sufficient. If the issue is, however, whether an
ostensibly valid consent was vitiated by the physician's failure to
disclose a certain risk (lack of informed consent), expert testimony may be necessary to determine whether the physician's
disclosure was adequate. Should the court measure the standard
of disclosure by the prevalent practice within the medical community,2 7 expert testimony will be necessary to inform the jury as
to what the community standard of disclosure is. On the other
hand, if the court determines that the physician must disclose
those risks which would be material to an informed decision,
expert testimony will not be necessary. Hence, the necessity of
expert testimony in lack of informed consent cases depends upon
which standard of disclosure is adopted rather than on the theory
of liability relied upon by the court.
The court's decision regarding the negligence-battery question may also have an effect on the causation issue. Proximate
cause, a necessary element of both intentional and negligent
torts, is a judicial method of setting a boundary "to liability for
the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea
of justice or policy." 8 Courts are therefore willing to expand the
sphere of liability in the case of intentional as opposed to negligent torts on the theory that there is something more "punishable" when a tort is intended. 9 Some commentators have even
suggested that punitive damages might be awarded on a battery
theory of liability, 3" but this is highly unlikely unless there is a
showing of intent to harm or at least recklessness.
Resolution of the battery-negligence issue is of particular significance where an affirmative defense based on the statute of
limitations may be raised. Before the Malpractice Act, if a New
York court determined that medical treatment in the absence of
an informed consent was a battery, the one-year battery statute
of limitations would be applied, 3' whereas if the failure to obtain
an informed consent was held to be medical malpractice (profes27. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
28. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 237 (4th ed. 1971).

29. Id. § 5.
30. See, e.g., Comment, Informed Consent As a Theory of Medical Liability, 1970
Wis. L. REv. 879, 884.

31. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 215 (3) (McKinney 1972).
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sional negligence), the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice would be applied.3 2 Thus it was not at all uncommon, even in recent years, for a New York court to dismiss a
plaintiff's cause of action based on lack of informed consent because the plaintiff failed to sue within one year of the commission
of the tort.33 For example, in Cox v. Stretton34 the plaintiff consulted the defendant-surgeon about a vasectomy. The surgeon
failed to advise Mr. Cox that such an operation would not completely eliminate the possibility of conception. A year and onehalf after the operation Mrs. Cox became pregnant. The plantiff
sued the surgeon in an action alleging lack of informed consent.
The court determined that the cause of action was for battery and
therefore had begun to accrue at the time of the unlawful touching. Thus, the one-year battery statute of limitations barred
plaintiff's suit. If the court had concluded that the physician's
failure to disclose constituted medical malpractice, the threeyear statute would have applied and the plaintiff's suit would
have been timely.
The question of the appropriate statute of limitations is partially resolved by section 1 (section 2805-d) 35 and section 636 of the
Malpractice Act. Section 2805-d explicitly recognizes that a physician's failure to disclose certain risks or alternatives constitutes
medical malpractice. Section 6 of the Act, which adds section
214-a to the Civil Practice Law and Rules, requires that an action
for medical malpractice be commenced within two years and six
months of the act, omission, or failure complained of. Thus,
where the plaintiff alleges lack of informed consent based upon
an undisclosed risk or alternative, as in Cox v. Stretton, a court
may no longer hold that such an action is a battery and the two
and one-half year statute applicable to medical malpractice actions must govern.
The provision in section 214-a that the cause of action begins
to accrue at the time of the act, omission, or failure complained
32. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214 (6) (McKinney 1972). This section has been amended by the
Malpractice Act, and such actions are now governed by the two and one-half year statute
of limitations established by section 6 of the Act. Id. § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1975). See
note 36 infra and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Murriello v. Crapotta, 174 N.Y.L.J. 57, Sept. 19, 1975, at 9, col. 3. (Sup.
Ct. Queens County).
34. 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1974).
35. For the text of this section, see note 4 supra.
36. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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of conforms with the general rule, developed by case law, that a
malpractice cause of action begins to accrue at the time of the
alleged malpractice.- A negligence cause of action does not begin
to accrue until there is actual injury.38 The time of actual injury
and the time of the act, omission, or failure complained of do not
necessarily coincide. For example, in the Cox case, the malpractice occurred when the physician failed to disclose a certain risk,
but the actual injury did not occur until the plaintiff's wife became pregnant. Under section 214-a, if the undisclosed risk becomes a reality more than two and one-half years after the date
of the physician's nondisclosure, the plaintiff's suit is barred by
the statute of limitations, regardless of the fact that the plaintiff
could not have known of the malpractice before the statute of
limitations had expired.
It is unclear whether the two and one-half year statute of
limitations will apply to situations where the physician obtained
no consent or exceeded the consent (those cases which the Cobbs
and Bruse courts indicated should be classified as battery). It is
possible that such cases may continue to be treated as batteries
by the New York courts since section 1 of the Malpractice Act is
confined to situations where the physician failed to disclose a
particular risk, and might not apply to cases where there was no
consent or where the consent was exceeded. Thus, New York
courts may continue to apply the one-year battery statute to such
cases. It is the opinion of the author that the battery theory of
liability should be applied, if at all, to those cases where the injury is limited to the unlawful touching. If the unlawful touching
results in actual injury, the two and one-half year medical malpractice statute of limitation should be applied. Since section
2805-d (3)31 requires that the lack of informed consent be established as a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which
recovery is sought, it is clear that according to the Malpractice
Act, actual injury is a necessary element of this cause of action.
37. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d
142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963); County of Broome v. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 889, 358
N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974); Rokita v. Germaine, 12 Misc. 2d 84, 176
N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), afl'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 620, 185 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d
Dep't 1958).
38. See, e.g., White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Gile v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 281 App. Div. 95, 120 N.Y.S. 2d 258 (3d Dep't 1952). See generally, W.
POSSEHR, LAW OF ToRTs § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
39. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (3) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of this
section, see note 4 supra.
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Actual injury is the distinctive element of the negligence
action whereas the invasion of a protected interest distinguishes trespass (battery). Certainly where there is no consent, or
where the consent has been exceeded and an undisclosed risk
becomes a reality, there is also a lack of informed consent. Furthermore, under most common law batteries, the plaintiff is immediately aware of the tort and thus a shorter statute of limitations is appropriate. In a medical context, however, the unfortunate results of the treatment may not be manifest until well after
the one-year battery statute of limitations has expired; and this
is so where there is no consent or where the consent has been
exceeded as well as in the traditional lack of informed consent
case. Given the legislative intent of protecting the patient's right
to consent to treatment, a plaintiff should be allowed two and
one-half years to bring suit in all lack of consent cases which
result in actual injury.
By establishing that lack of informed consent cases are to be
governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, the
New York State Legislature has settled the battery-negligence
controversy in the following manner: the failure of the physician
to obtain an informed consent is neither negligence nor battery-it is medical malpractice. Medical malpractice is professional negligence, and the distinctions between professional negligence and ordinary negligence are substantial, particularly where
the cause of action is based on lack of informed consent. For
example, in a negligence suit the standard of care required of the
defendant is measured by the conduct of the reasonable man,"
whereas a malpractice suit is predicated upon the failure of the
physician to exercise the care and skill required of a reasonable
medical practitioner under similar circumstances.4 ' Thus, section
2805-d (1)42 provides that in lack of informed consent cases, a
reasonable medical practitioner standard is used to measure the
sufficiency of the disclosure. Furthermore, a negligence suit may
be maintained whenever the negligence of one individual proximately results in injury to another to whom a duty of care is
owed.4 3 According to section 2805-d (2),44 however, a cause of ac40. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs

§ 32

(4th ed. 1971).

41. Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1949); Fiorentino v.
Jaques, 41 Misc. 2d 972, 246 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964).
42. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
43. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
44. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (2) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of this
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tion based on lack of informed consent is limited to cases
involving non-emergency treatment or a diagnostic procedure
which invades or disrupts the integrity of the body. Section
2805-d (3)45 requires a plaintiff to establish not only proximate
cause (as in negligence) but also to prove that a reasonably prudent patient in the plaintiff's position would not have undergone
the treatment or diagnosis if the undisclosed risk had been disclosed. Section 2805-d (4)46 provides four defenses which in
some respects resemble contributory negligence or assumption
of the risk, but in other respects are quite unique. Finally, although actual injury is an essential element of both negligence
and professional negligence, the general rule is that a cause of
action for negligence does not begin to accrue until there is actual
injury whereas in a malpractice suit the cause of action begins to
accrue at the time of the alleged malpractice.
Scope of Disclosure
According to case law, an uninformed consent is tantamount
to no consent at all.47 True consent, the court in Canterbury v.
Spence observed, "is the informed exercise of a choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options
available and the risks attendant upon each."48 The problem,
however, is in determining when an ostensibly valid consent is
vitiated because of the physician's failure to apprise the patient
of certain risks inherent in, or the alternatives to, a proposed
treatment. The determinative question is whether the risk or
alternative which was not disclosed is of sufficient magnitude to
nullify the consent." Courts have defined this issue in terms of
the "scope of disclosure." Some courts have held that the scope
of disclosure should be measured by the prevalent practice in the
medical community,' while other courts have required the physisection, see note 4 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 74 infra.
46. See text accompanying notes 86-120 infra.
47. Darrah v. Kite, 32 App. Div. 2d 208, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dep't 1969); accord,
Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962); Birnbaum v. Siegler, 273 App. Div.
817 (2d Dep't 1948); Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
48. 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
49. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
50. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961); Haggerty v.
McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562, 565-66 (1962); Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich.
133, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675-76 (Mo. 1965);
Petterson v. Lynch, 59 Misc. 2d 469, 470-71, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245-46 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1969).
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cian to divulge those risks which, "tested by general considerations of reasonable disclosure, under all the circumstances, will
materially affect the patient's decision whether to proceed with
the treatment."'"
The medical community standard appears to have evolved
from the "locality rule" which was designed to protect
unsophisticated country physicians who lacked "that high degree
of art and skill possessed by eminent surgeons practicing in larger
cities." 52 Critics have questioned the relevance of the rule in light
of advances in communication and transportation. 3 One commentator suggests "it is doubtful that a custom of disclosure
actually exists in a community of physicians,"" while another
states that55
even if [such a standard] did exist, it would necessarily be so
general as to be of little value. . . . [and] must be based on
what [the testifying experts] would have done, or on what they
believe others should have done, rather than on an application
of a standard agreed upon by the profession as a whole.
One of the necessary evils of the community standard is the
"battle between medical witnesses of the opposing parties."5 A
jury cannot know whether a physician's disclosure conformed to
the community standard unless it is aided by an expert witness
who can testify as to what that standard is. Thus, the plaintiff
has the burden of producing an expert who will testify that the
reasonable medical practitioner within the community would
have disclosed the risk which the defendant-physician failed to
disclose. The defendant may attempt to rebut this allegation by
adducing expert testimony that it is not the customary practice
within the medical community to disclose the particular risk.
This time-consuming, costly, and confusing battle between ex51. Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (4th
Dep't 1973). See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Zeleznik v.
Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (2d Dep't 1975).
52. Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131, 136, 35 Am. Rep. 363, 365 (1880).
53. See, e.g., Nations & Surgent, Medical Malpractice and the Locality Rule, 14 S.
T xAs L.J. 129 (1973); Comment, Medical Malpractice-"The Locality Rule" and the
"Conspiracy of Silence," 22 S.C. L. REV. 810 (1970); Note, 6 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 279
(1974). But see King & Coe, The Wisdom of the Strict Locality Rule, 3 U. BALT. L. REV.
221 (1974).
54. Note, Failure to Inform as Medical Malpractice,23 VAND. L. REV. 754, 768 (1970).
55. Note, 75 HAuv. L. REV. 1445, 1447 (1962).
56. Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 206,366 N.Y.S.2d
163, 171 (2d Dep't 1975).
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pert witnesses has, in recent years, prompted the New York
courts to reject the questionably relevant community standard."
For instance, in Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital the
court stated:"
The distractions of a battle between medical witnesses of the
opposing parties as to an alleged community standard of disclosed risks have no place in a rational attempt to learn which
risks, tested by general considerations of reasonable disclosure
under all the circumstances, should have been disclosed as materially affecting the patient's decision whether to proceed with
the treatment.
Once a court concludes that the physician's duty is to disclose
those risks which may have a material effect on the patient's
decision, the need for expert testimony on this issue is obviated
since the jury is capable of making such a determination without
the aid of an expert. Courts of other jurisdictions have also rejected the medical community standard. 9 In Canterbury v.
Spence"0 the court found "no basis for operation of the special
medical standard where the physician's activity does not bring
his medical knowledge and skills peculiarly into play."', The

court therefore concluded:"
The decision to unveil the patient's condition and the chances
as to remediation. . . is oft-times a non-medical judgment and,
if so, is a decision outside the ambit of the special standard.
Where that is the situation, professional custom hardly furnishes the legal criterion for measuring the physician's responsibility to reasonably inform his patient of the options and the
hazards as to treatment.
57. Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163
(2d Dep't 1975); Garone v. Roberts' Technical & Trade School, Inc., 47 App. Div. 2d
306, 366 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1st Dep't 1975); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344
N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1973); Barnette v. Potenza, 79 Misc. 2d 51, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974).
58. Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 206,366 N.Y.S.2d
163, 171 (2d Dep't 1975).
59. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295
A.2d 676 (1972).
60. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 785.
62. Id. The use of the word "ofttimes" in the quoted passage presumably is a recognition of the "emergency" and "therapeutic privilege" doctrines which the court refers to
later in the opinion as exceptions to the general rule of disclosure. When these two exceptions are invoked the decision to unveil the patient's condition must be tempered by
medical judgment. *Seenotes 107 & 112 infra and accompanying text.
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. . . And surely in nondisclosure cases the factfinder is not
invariably functioning in an area of such technical complexity
that it must be bound to medical custom as an inexorable application of the community standard of reasonable care.
. . . We hold that the standard measuring performance [of
the physician's duty to disclose] is conduct which is reasonable
under the circumstances.
The reasonableness of a physician's conduct is ordinarily a
matter beyond the scope of the jury. For example, without the aid
of an expert, would a jury know whether it is reasonable to permit
tightly packed Surgicel to remain in the body13 or whether reasonable medical practice requires that an X-ray be taken of a fractured bone which had been successfully united seven years before?64 Expert testimony is unquestionably needed to resolve such
matters and its admissibility is governed by the rule of necessity. 6
The "material risk" standard, however, eliminates the need
for expert testimony. Courts adopting this standard are, in effect,
concluding that medical considerations play no part in the decision to reveal the risks of a proposed treatment. In rejecting the
material risk standard, one court observed that to require the
physician to disclose risks which may have a material effect on
the patient's decision is to require the physician to second-guess
the patient.6
The standard of disclosure established by the Medical Malpractice Insurance Act appears to lie somewhere between the
physician-oriented community standard and the patient-oriented
material risk standard. Section 2805-d (1) defines lack of in67
formed consent to be
the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or
diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and
the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would
have disclosed, in a manner permitting the patient to make a
knowledgeable evaluation.
63. Brannon v. Wood, 251 Ore. 348, 444 P.2d 558 (1968).
64. Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938).
65. See E. FIScH, NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 412 (10th ed. Prince 1973); UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE rules 56-61 (1953). See also Ordover, Expert Testimony: A Proposalfor New
York, 19 N.Y.L. FoRUM 809 (1974).
66. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
67. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 5

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1976]

The benefits to be expected from, the risks inherent in, and the
alternatives to a proposed treatment are medical facts which the
physician is expected to know. The decision to disclose these facts
to the patient, however, is a nonmedical judgment, and depends
on which medical facts the physician believes the patient is entitled to know. Since this decision is ultimately a nonmedical judgment, the reasonableness of it may be determined by the jury
without the aid of expert testimony. Without the aid of expert
testimony, however, the jury could not know the benefits, risks,
or alternatives involved in the proposed treatment. Hence,
section 9 of the Malpractice Act" requires the court to grant a
defendant's motion at the end of the plaintiff's case if the plaintiff
has failed to adduce any expert testimony in support of the alleged insufficiency of the consent. The consent is insufficient if
the disclosure fails to satisfy the standard established by section
2805-d (1). Thus, the plaintiff must produce an expert who will
testify about the particular medical treatment, specifically the
benefits and risks involved as well as any alternatives thereto.
The jury must then decide, in light of these medical facts,
whether the physician was acting reasonably in failing to disclose
whatever medical facts the plaintiff alleges should have been disclosed. In order to make this determination, the jury should appreciate the purpose and policy behind the doctrine of informed
consent-that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body ...

."69 and that "[u]nlimited discretion in the physician

is irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the
ultimate informed decision regarding the course of treatment to
which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected." '
Section 2805-d (1), it should be noted, is qualified by the
phrase, "in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation." The primary function of this qualification
is to require the physician to make the disclosure in plain and
68. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4401-a (McKinney Supp. 1975). This section provides:
A motion for judgment at the end of the plaintiff's case must be granted as to
any cause of action for medical malpractice based solely on lack of informed
consent if the plaintiff has failed to adduce expert medical testimony in support
of the alleged qualitative insufficiency of the consent.
69. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
70. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
71. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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simple language in order that the ordinary patient, unversed in
technical medical terminology, will be able to comprehend fully
the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment. 2 The explicit
legislative intent is, nevertheless, to protect the patient's right to
make a knowledgeable evaluation, and the plaintiff is entitled to
have the jury so instructed. Considering the fiduciary nature of
the physician-patient relationship, 73 and assuming that the risk,
benefit, or alternative has been established through expert testimony as reasonably foreseeable, the jury should conclude that the
physician was not acting as a reasonable medical practitioner
under similar circumstances would have acted if the nondisclosure abrogated the patient's right to make a knowledgeable evaluation.
Causation
Elementary tort law dictates that a breach of duty will not
result in liability unless the breach is causally related to the
plaintiffs injury. 74 The causation issue in lack of informed consent cases is often quite subtle and elusive since the inquiry must
perforce analyze the effect of certain words (or the absence of
them) on the human mind. The problem which the courts have
attempted to resolve is whether the plaintiff establishes proximate cause by testifying that had the risk been disclosed, he or
she would not have undergone the treatment. Such testimony is
bound to be unreliable. Once the undisclosed risk has become a
reality, even an honest plaintiff will find it difficult to testify
objectively regarding the effect disclosure would have had, and
most will vigorously assert that they would not have undergone
the treatment had the risk been disclosed. In Zeleznik v. Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital,75 one of the issues on appeal was the
trial judge's instruction to the jury that resolution of the proximate cause issue depended upon whether the plaintiff would not
have submitted to the treatment had he been fully informed. In
reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the appellate division held
72. In Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972), the court noted that "the patient's interest in information does not extend to a
lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A mini-course in medical
science is not required ....
Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. See also
Shartsis, Informed Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REV. 527,548-50 (1972).

73. See note 86 infra and accompanying text.
74. See generally, W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
75. 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (2d Dep't 1975).
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that the correct test of proximate cause was whether a reasonably
prudent patient in the plaintiff's position would not have undergone the treatment had the risk been disclosed. 7 To hold other7
wise, the court observed, would place the physician 1
at the mercy of the patient's hindsight. Honest though he may
be, the disastrous results of the therapy necessarily affects the
patient's guess as to whether the risks, if divulged, would have
been acceptable.
The court concluded that the plaintiff's testimony is relevant,
though not conclusive, in determining the effect that disclosure
of the risk would have had on the "reasonably prudent patient."
In order to determine whether the physician should be legally
responsible for failing to meet the standard of disclosure established in section 2805-d (1), the plaintiff must satisfy the two
causation requirements set forth in section 2805-d (3).78 According
to section 2805-d (3), the plaintiff must establish that a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have undergone the treatment or diagnosis had he been fully informed,
and that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause of the
injury or condition for which recovery is sought.
As indicated by the Zeleznik court, the purpose of the "reasonably prudent patient" standard is to protect the physician. In
order to do this, however, it becomes necessary to sacrifice the
rights of certain patients. For example, suppose two patients, A
and B, are suffering from the same disease which, if untreated,
will inevitably result in death. If treated there is a risk of blindness which is always disclosed by the reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances. A and B consult a physician
who does not disclose this risk. Both submit to the treatment and
both go blind. Assume A would have undergone the treatment
had the risk been disclosed, but B would not have undergone the
treatment had the risk been disclosed. A jury would most probably find that the reasonably prudent patient in A or B's position
would undergo the treatment even if the risk was disclosed because it is unreasonable not to risk blindness if death is the inevitable result of foregoing the treatment. At their trials, both A and
76. Id. at 207, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 171. See also Comment, Failureto Inform as Medical
Malpractice,23 VAND. L. REv. 754 (1970).
77. 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 207, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163, 171 (2d Dep't 1975).
78. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (3) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of this
section, see note 4 supra.
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B testify that they would not have consented to the treatment
had the risk of blindness been disclosed, but A is testifying falsely
whereas B is telling the truth. Neither A nor B can recover, according to section 2805-d (3), if the jury determines that the reasonably prudent patient would have undergone the treatment
even if the risk of blindness had been disclosed. In order to prevent A from recovering, B's right to be unreasonable has been
sacrificed.
Assuming the plaintiff is able to surmount the "reasonably
prudent patient" hurdle, section 2805-d (3) also requires that the
lack of informed consent be established as a proximate cause of
the injury or condition for which recovery is sought. Before it can
be determined that the defendant's failure to obtain an informed
consent is a proximate cause, such conduct must be established
as a "cause-in-fact" of the injury or condition for which recovery
is sought.7 9 Proof of causation-in-fact is offered when the plaintiff
testifies that but for the physician's failure to disclose, consent
would not have been given." Causation-in-fact, however, does not
establish liability. For example, suppose that but for the physician's failure to disclose a certain risk the plaintiff would not have
consented to an operation. Suppose further that during the operation a fire occurred in the hospital and the plaintiff was badly
burned. The physician's failure to obtain an informed consent is
a cause-in-fact of the injury-but for the physician's failure to
disclose, the plaintiff would not have been burned. It is not,
however, a legal (proximate) cause of the injury.
According to Dean Prosser, proximate cause is a method of
limiting legal responsibility'
to those causes which are so closely connected with the result
and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing
liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice
or policy.
Considerations of duty and foreseeability are necessary to determine whether a cause-in-fact will be viewed as a proximate
cause.82 For instance, in the hypothetical presented in the
79. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
80. Id. This is known as the "but for" or "sine qua non" rule.
81. Id. at 237.
82. See, e.g., Stanton v. State, 29 App. Div. 2d 612, 285 N.Y.S.2d 964 (3d Dep't 1967),
aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 990, 259 N.E.2d 494, 311 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1970); Jansen v. State, 60 Misc.
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preceding paragraph, the defendant's conduct is not the proximate cause of the injury because it was not the physician's duty
to protect the plaintiff from the unforeseeable risk of fire. Suppose, however, that during the operation an anesthesiologist's
negligence results in an injury which is unrelated to the undisclosed risk. This negligence may be viewed as a foreseeable intervening cause, and thus the original tortfeasor's failure to disclose
may be considered to be a proximate cause of the injury.83 If the
undisclosed risk is the same risk which later materializes or is a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the physician's failure to
disclose, a court should hold that the defendant's conduct in
failing to obtain an informed consent is a proximate cause of the
injury or condition for which recovery is sought.
In attempting to resolve the issue of proximate cause in lack
of informed consent cases, courts have applied either the "reasonably prudent patient" test," i.e., would a reasonably prudent
patient in the plaintiffs position have undergone the treatment
had the risk been disclosed, or the "actual plaintiff" test, 5 i.e.,
would the actual plaintiff have undergone the treatment had the
risk been disclosed. The former test has recently gained favor as
courts have concluded that the "actual plaintiff' test is unfair to
the defendant due to the self-serving nature of the plaintiffs
testimony. In apparent agreement, the New York State Legislature has rejected the "actual plaintiff' test by incorporating the
"reasonably prudent patient" test into section 2805-d (3). The
requirement of proximate cause does not impose any additional
burden on the plaintiff since proximate cause was a necessary
element of the plaintiff's case before the Act was passed. The
plaintiff must, however, establish that the defendant's conduct is
a proximate cause of the injury or condition for which recovery is
2d 36, 301 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Ct. Cl. 1968), aff'd, 32 App. Div. 2d 889, 302 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (4th
Dep't 1969).
83. For cases which hold that a physician's intervening negligent treatment does not
relieve the original tortfeasor of liability see Jess Edwards, Inc. v. Goergen, 256 F.2d 542
(10th Cir. 1958); City of Covington v. Keal, 280 Ky. 237, 133 S.W.2d 49 (1939); Thompson
v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (1937) and cases colldcted in Annot., 100 A.LR.2d 808
(1965).
84. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242-43, 502 P.2d 1, 9-10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513-14 (1972); Zeleznik
v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App. Div. 2d 199, 207, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163, "171-72 (2d
Dep't 1975); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 473, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (4th
Dep't 1973).
85. See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967).
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sought. Thus, unlike battery, actual injury must have occurred
as a result of the defendant's failure to disclose in order for a
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case. In all cases, therefore,
where the injury or condition for which recovery is sought is a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the physician's nondisclosure, the plaintiff's testimony that he or she would not have consented to the treatment had the risk been disclosed should be
sufficient to satisfy the proximate cause requirement. It should
then be for the jury to decide whether the plaintiff would have
been acting as a reasonably prudent patient in not consenting,
and if the jury answers this question affirmatively, the two causation requirements of section 2805-d (3) have been satisfied.
Defenses
The duty of the doctor to inform the patient is a fiduciary
duty." Both the legal and medical professions recognize that due
to the fiduciary nature of the relationship, certain situations arise
wherein the physician may proceed to treat the patient without
first obtaining an informed consent, yet not be liable for negligence, malpractice, or battery. The duty to disclose is a means
to an end-protecting the welfare of the patient. If sound medical
judgment dictates that less than full disclosure is necessary to
protect the patient's welfare, the physician should be allowed to
proceed without obtaining an informed consent, provided that
the justification for the nondisclosure is "reasonable." "[Tihe
validity of a defense," one court remarked, "is considered from
7
the standpoint of concern for the well-being of the patient."
According to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Act, where a
patient alleges that the physician failed to disclose a risk which
ought to have been disclosed, the physician may attempt to justify the nondisclosure by raising one of the four defenses established by section 2805-d (4).11
Section 2805-d (4)(a)-Risk too commonly known to warrant
disclosure
If the patient is able to establish through expert testimony
86.
2d 465,
(1970).
87.
88.
section

Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162, 1166 (1971), aff'd, 81 Wash.
502 P.2d 1194 (1972); Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wash. App. 342, 474 P.2d 909, 916
Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852, 864 (1974).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (4) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of this
see note 4 supra.
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that the reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances would have revealed a particular risk which the defendant failed to disclose, the defendant might testify that the risk
was not disclosed because it is too commonly known to warrant
disclosure. 9 In order to assert this defense, the physician must
have reasonably believed that the patient knew of the risk and
was willing to assume it. "In its simplest and primary sense,"
90
Dean Prosser writes,
assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has
given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of
conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a
known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave
undone. The situation is then the same as where the plaintiff
consents to the infliction of what would otherwise be an intentional tort.
[T]he plaintiff may be acting quite reasonably, because the advantages of his conduct outweigh the risk.
Consent is now generally recognized as the basis of assumption
of the risk.9 As one court observed, however, "[k]nowledge of
'9 2
the risk is the watchword of the defense of assumption of risk.
If knowledge is indeed the watchword, the following statement by
the Canterbury court may be difficult to reconcile with the "commonly known risk" defense:93
The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can
look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent decision . ..
* * . His dependence upon the physician for information
affecting his well-being, in terms of contemplated treatment, is
well-nigh abject.
As dependent as they may be, most patients are aware that
certain medical procedures are inherently risky. Even the
Canterbury court, aware of the ignorance and helplessness of the
patient, recognized that "[s]ome dangers-infection, for exam89. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (4)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of
this subsection see note 4 supra.
90. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 68, at 440 (4th ed. 1971).
91. Id.
92. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Thompson, 236 F. 1, 9 (6th Cir. 1916).
93. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-82 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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ple -are inherent in any operation; there is no obligation to
communicate those [risks] of which persons of average sophisti'94
cation are aware.
The difficulty with the defense is in determining what kind
of risks are contemplated by the phrase "commonly known."
Canterbury adopts an objective "persons of average sophistication" standard. Subsection (a) of section 2805-d (4) is silent, however, as to any standard by which to judge whether a risk is
commonly known. Should the standard be nondisclosure of those
risks which persons of average sophistication are aware (objective), or should the physician be required to prove he or she was
justified in believing that the actual plaintiff was aware of the
risk (subjective)?
A subjective standard is usually preferred in an assumption
of the risk defense." Accordingly, in a negligence suit the defendant must establish that the actual plaintiff knew of the risk and
voluntarily elected to encounter it." A cause of action based on
lack of informed consent, however, is an action for malpractice,
not ordinary negligence, and arguably a different standard might
apply. Under the subjective standard the jury must find that the
defendant-physician reasonably believed disclosure of the particular risk was unnecessary because the patient was already aware
of it, whereas under an objective standard the physician would
attempt to prove that a patient of average sophistication would
have been aware of the risk. The language of the statute offers no
guidance since it fails to state to whom the risk must be commonly known in order for the defense to succeed. It is submitted,
however, that the subjective standard is more consistent with the
fiduciary nature of the patient-physician relationship. It is also
more consistent with the other three defenses established by
section 2805-d (4). If this subjective standard is not read into
subsection 2805-d (4) (a), it will be the only defense which focuses
on the risk and scope of disclosure rather than on the extenuating
circumstances of the particular patient's situation.
94. Id. at 788.
95. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRrs § 68 (4th ed. 1971); see, e.g., Vierra v. Fifth Avenue
Rental Serv., 60 Cal. 2d 266, 383 P.2d 777, 32 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1963); Aides v. St. Paul
Baseball Club, 251 Minn. 440, 88 N.W.2d 94 (1958).
96. Id.
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Section 2805-d (4)(b)-Waiver
Section 2805-d (4)(b)9" allows for waiver of the right to be
fully informed and is clearly focused on the particular plaintiff.
This defense may be raised if the patient assures the physician
that he or she intends to undergo the treatment regardless of the
risks or does not want the risks disclosed. In both cases the assurances of the patient operate as a waiver thereby relieving the
physician of the duty to disclose.
The use of the word "assured" in this section is significant.
As originally enacted the second clause of the subsection read:"5
[or] indicated to the medical practitioner that he did not want
to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to
be informed.
This was later amended by substituting "assured" for "indicated
to." 9 In order for the waiver to be a valid defense, more than a
mere indication is necessary. The patient's assurance should be
explicit and unambiguous.
Section 2805-d (4)(c)-Consent Not Reasonably
Possible-EmergencyDoctrine
In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital""Mr. Justice Cardozo established the general rule that a physician who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an
assault.'0 1 The court recognized, however, that an exception applies "in case of emergency where the patient is unconscious and
where it is necessary to operate before consent can be
obtained."' 0
The sound policy considerations which give rise to the exception are well stated in Sullivan v. Montgomery:"3
To hold that a physician or surgeon must wait until perhaps he
may be able to secure the consent of the parents, who may not
be available, before administering an anaesthetic or giving to
the person injured the benefit of his skill and learning, to the
97. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d (4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of

this subsection see note 4 supra.
98. Ch. 109, § 1, [19751 McKinney's Laws of N.Y. 134.
99. Ch. 476, § 1, [1975] McKinney's Laws of N.Y. 715.
100. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
101. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
102. Id. at 130, 105 N.E. at 93.
103. 155 Misc. 448, 449-50, 279 N.Y.S. 575, 577 (City Ct. Bronx County 1935).
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end that pain and suffering may be alleviated, may result in the
loss of many lives and pain and suffering which might otherwise
be prevented.

Emergency situations frequently arise in which a valid consent cannot immediately be obtained. For example, an unconscious, severely injured patient urgently in need of medical attention may be brought to the physician's office, 04 or the patient
may be conscious, but incapable of giving a valid consent due to
minority.0 5 A surgeon operating on an anesthetized patient from
whom a valid consent has been obtained may discover a serious
condition unrelated to the problem for which the consent was
originally obtained but which can be corrected by immediate
surgery.' The question in all such cases and as required by section 2805-d (4)(c)'"7 is whether consent by or on behalf of the
patient is reasonably possible. Resolution of this issue depends
upon the facts of each case, but the general test of reasonableness
in an emergency situation is whether the harm threatened by
delaying in order to obtain a valid, informed consent is greater
than the harm threatened by the emergency treatment."' If the
harm threatened by delay is greater, the physician is not only
justified in administering treatment, but has a duty to do so,111'
and the consent of the patient will be implied."'
Section 2805-d (4) (d)- Therapeutic Privilege
Implicit in all four defenses established by section 2805-d
104. See, e.g., Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912). In New York, if
a physician renders first aid or emergency treatment at the scene of an accident, section
6527 (2) of the Education Law provides that unless gross negligence can be established,
the physician will not be liable for injuries which result by reason of an act or omission
which allegedly occurred while such aid was being rendered. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6527 (2)
(McKinney 1972).
105. See, e.g., Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1949).
106. See, e.g., Stone v. Goodman, 241 App. Div. 290, 271 N.Y.S. 500 (1st Dep't 1934).
See also cases collected in Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
107. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (4)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of
this subsection see note 4 supra.
108. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
109. Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P.2d 68 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949):
Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
110. This is not a true "implied consent" situation, according to Dean Prosser, since
no conduct by the patient indicates any willingness to consent. Therefore, it is more
accurate to say that "the [physician] is privileged because he is reasonably entitled to
assume that, if the patient were competent and understood the situation, he would consent, and therefore [the physician may] act as if it has been given." W. PRosspR, LAW OF
TORTS § 18, at 103 (4th ed. 1971).
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(4) is a recognition of the flexibility which must be accorded
physicians if they are to continue to function effectively. As one
commentator observed, "a surgeon cannot operate if one hand
holds Gray's Anatomy and the other holds Corpus Juris."' The
physician does not sell medical services in an arm's length transaction with the patient, and rules which govern their relationship
cannot be enforced like a commercial code. Thus, subsection (d)
of section 2805-d (4)112 allows the physician a privilege to withhold

certain information which ordinarily would be divulged if the
physician reasonably believes that such disclosure could
adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition. "The
critical inquiry," the court observed in Canterbury v. Spence,
"is whether the physician responded to a sound medical judgment that communication of the risk information would present
a threat to the patient's well-being."'
An example of a case where the therapeutic privilege clearly
applied was Nishi v. Hartwell."' The plaintiff had been suffering
from hypertension (high blood pressure) and chest pains. The
defendant-doctor gave the following testimony:" 5
I mentioned he had high blood pressure, he had pain in his chest
which we were trying to find an answer to, and if I had sat down
with [the plaintiff] and said, 'We are about to inject something
into you which has a remote chance of causing you to be paralyzed, you may get an immediate reaction which will cost you
your life,' if I had said these things to [the plaintiff], I think it
would have been a terrible mistake.
Where the patient suffers from a physiological condition which
might be aggravated by a psychological shock, the therapeutic
privilege to withhold information applies because disclosure may
reasonably be expected to have a direct -negative effect on the
patient's condition.
Some courts and commentators have indicated that the privilege may be applied to situations in which the effect of disclosure
would not directly affect the condition."' For example, in Roberts
111. Levin, Consent to Medical Procedures, 1963 INS. L.J. 711.
112. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (4)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1975). For the text of
this section see note 4 supra.

113. 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
114. 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970).
115. 473 P.2d at 120.
116. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 246, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972)
(privilege might apply where disclosure would be so upsetting that "the patient would not
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v. Wood," 7 the plaintiff was suffering from a toxic goiter, and it
was determined that an operation to remove part of her thyroid
gland was necessary. The physician failed to disclose that damage
to the vocal cords is an inherent risk of a thyroidectomy, and as
a result of the operation the plaintiff's right vocal cord became
paralyzed, reducing her speaking ability to a mere whisper. The
court, holding that the disclosure was sufficient, reasoned that
"[niot only is much of the risk of a technical nature beyond the
patient's understanding, but the anxiety, apprehension, and fear
generated by a full disclosure thereof may have a very detrimental effect on some patients.""'
The distinctive feature of Nishi v. Hartwell is the presence
of a plaintiff whose physical condition could be directly worsened
by the psychological shock of full disclosure, whereas in Roberts
v. Wood, full disclosure could not directly worsen the condition
of the goiter. Indirectly, however, if the patient decides to forego
a necessary operation due to an irrational fear, the condition may
eventually worsen. On this point, the court in Canterbury v.
Spence offered the following caveat:" 9
The physician's privilege to withhold information for therapeutic reasons must be carefully circumscribed . . . for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself. The privilege does
not accept the paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent because divulgence might prompt the patient to
forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs.
The therapeutic privilege is "carefully circumscribed" by the
language of subsection (d) of section 2805-d (4) in the thricerepeated requirement of reasonableness, and the phrase "adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition." It is
submitted that these rather stringent requirements indicate a
be able to dispassionately weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment"); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, clarified and reh. denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960) (in dicta the court suggested a privilege to withhold where
disclosure of some dread disease would jeopardize the chances of recovery); Watson v.
Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964) (patient needed thyroid removed-court
recognized undesirability of sending a patient who was nervous from fright to the operating room). See also Lund, The Doctor, the Patient, and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. R~v. 344
(1946); Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick
With Serious or FatalIllness, 19 TENN. L. REv. 349 (1946); Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1445
(1962).
117. 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962).
118. Id. at 583.
119. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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legislative intent to allow the privilege under only the most extreme circumstances, as were present in Nishi v. Hartwell. The
question is not whether the physician actually believed nondisclosure would have a substantially adverse effect but whether such
a belief was reasonable from a medical point of view.
The defenses present issues of fact which must be resolved
by the jury. Although the burden of proof is on the defendant,
expert testimony could be offered by either party to demonstrate
whether the physician's judgment was medically reasonable
where either the "emergency doctrine" or "therapeutic privilege"
defenses are raised.'20 Expert testimony would not be necessary
where the defense is based on "waiver" since the only issue is
whether the patient waived the right to be informed of the risks.
Neither would such testimony be appropriate to a "commonly
known risk" defense since it is highly unlikely that an expert is
qualified to testify with respect to what risks are commonly
known.
Conclusion
According to Governor Carey's accompanying memorandum,
the Medical Malpractice Insurance Act is intended to "deal comprehensively with the critical threat to the health and welfare of
the State as a result of the lack of adequate medical malpractice
insurance at reasonable rates.''2 Thus, certain provisions of the
Act are designed to limit the physician's malpractice liability in
order to reduce the cost of insurance premiums.
One such provision is section 6, which reduces the statute of
limitations in a medical malpractice action from three years to
two years and six months. Ironically, in a lack of informed consent case, this provision may have the effect of increasing the
statute of limitations from one year to two and one-half, since
prior to the Act some courts were applying the one-year battery
statute to such actions. Under the Act, lack of informed consent
is recognized as medical malpractice, and thus the two and onehalf year malpractice statute must be applied.
The Malpractice Act also attempts to limit a physician's
liability by adopting the "reasonable medical practitioner" standard of disclosure. The legislature's acceptance of this standard
represents a rejection of the physician-oriented community stan120. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
121. [19751 McKinney's Laws of N.Y. 1739.
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dard and the patient-oriented material risk standard. As a practical matter, the effect of the adoption of the standard established
by section 2805-d (1) is to require the plaintiff to adduce expert
testimony concerning the alleged insufficiency of the consent.
Since expert testimony can usually be obtained, this may amount
to no more than an inconvenience. On the other hand, some
plaintiffs may be more willing to settle out of court knowing that
expert testimony may in certain cases be difficult to obtain and
that the expert witness' fees will be deducted from the recovery
if the case has to go to trial.
In contrast to the legislature's rejection of the "material risk"
and "community" standards, the Act's incorporation of the "reasonably prudent patient" test of causation is consistent with
modern judicial trends. In effect, this test requires the jury to
make a factual determination that the plaintiff would have been
acting as a reasonably prudent person by not undergoing the
treatment had the risk been disclosed. The requirement of proximate cause places no additional burden on the plaintiff since
proximate causation was a necessary element of the plaintiff's
prima facie case even before the Act was passed.
The four defenses established by the Act may provide the
physician with a substantial coat of armor; hopefully, courts will
not allow these defenses to be abused. The protection of the patient's best interests, the fiduciary nature of the physicianpatient relationship, and the advantages of allowing the physician flexibility in exercising medical and human judgment should
serve as guiding considerations in determining the validity of a
defense.
Michael W. Rosen
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